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FOREWORD

ADOLESCENCE, CHOICE, AND PUNISHMENT
JOHN

H.

ROBINSON*

Puberty is a natural process, adolescence is a social construct. Thus puberty is relatively invariant across cultures; adolescence differs markedly from culture to culture. This is not to
demean adolescence, as if its status as a social construct rendered it second rate metaphysically. Nothing is more natural
for humans than is the creation of social constructs, and the
kind of construct that a culture imposes on a particular natural
process is immensely important. Indeed the impoverishment
of the social constructs that we modems have imposed on such
basic natural processes as birth, death, feeding, and copulation
is a source of great distress. It may be that we are inclined to
find life meaningless in ways that our ancestors did not simply
because our constructs fail to tap the full potential for meaning
of the natural processes that our bodiliness makes us heir to.
In the case of adolescence, the contours of that construct
are partially the by-product of certain social practices and partially the by-product of widely-shared, if rarely articulated, normative ideas. The social practices that I have in mind relate to
family structure, career pursuit, wealth distribution and the
like. These practices all weaken the extended family, the local
neighborhood, the religious community, and other institutions
that mediate between individuals and the state-the ultimate
enforcer of the social contract that must exist if human interaction is not to be wildly chaotic. The normative ideas that I have
in mind relate fundamentally to notions of human development
and secondarily to beliefs about the role that the state should
play in that development. My initial focus here will be on those
normative ideas; I will then develop what I call a responsive
account of punishment. But first, a word about the effect of
family structure, career pursuit, and wealth distribution on adolescence conceived of as a social construct.
Assistant Professor of Law and Philosophy and Director, Th0s. J.
White Center on Law & Government, Notre Dame Law School.
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We experience adolescence as we do not because we have
to and not because we choose to. We experience it as we do
because we have made other choices, choices whose relevance
to the structure of adolescence is rarely clear to us. We choose
wealth maximization over ill-defined alternatives as a route to
status and happiness, as almost synonymous with them. We
choose careers over the necessitous tedium of the fast food dispensary because we see careers as ways to make work meaningful and lucrative. We choose the nuclear family over the
extended family both for its fit with the imperatives of careerism and for the greater liberty that it confers on the married
couples and their children. We then offer our choices to our
children in ways that make it very difficult for them to criticize,
modify, or reject, as the short-lived counter-culture of the sixties illustrated.
Having made these choices, we discover that we have given
adolescence a structure that none of us intended, and that few
of us would wish, it to have. Adolescence is, for our children,
distressingly bereft of the effective guidance of solicitous
elders. It is something like the beach that the Galapagos sea
turtles must traverse before they can enter the safety of the
Pacific, a gauntlet full of risk and meretricious allure. Perhaps
this is how things must be if we are not to retrogress into some
form of state-imposed, illiberal, conformist community of just
the sort that the people of Central and Eastern Europe have
worked so hard to escape. But we make this gauntlet doubly,
and I think unnecessarily difficult, by the conceptual confusion
that we bring to the entire project of individual development. It
is to that confusion, and to its affect on our ideas of punishment, that I will devote the remainder of these reflections.
Confusion sets in as soon as we conceive of personal happiness as idiosyncoatic and opaque and of the good as basically
unknowable. I will argue, in contrast, that we make an awful
mess of things when we act as if we were, or at least ought to
be, agnostic on these matters. It is true, and not offensively
paternalistic, for me to say that I know what is good for you,
and for you to say that you know what is good for me. We do
have this knowledge, and we ought to act on it in structuring
and criticizing the social institutions and practices that influence our lives. Admittedly this knowledge is limited, taking the

form primarily of an awareness of the wrongness of the unwarranted resort to force and fraud in -our dealings with others.
Ethical theorists differ both as to how the principles that emanate from this awareness should be grounded and as to the
exceptions to them that might be justified, but those differ-
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ences do not nullify the crucial fact that we possess a shared
core of moral knowledge.
The existence of moral knowledge is relevant both to how
we assess the choices that we and others make and to how we
relate punishment to those choices. As for the first point, the
existence of moral knowledge delivers us from the presumed
opacity of personal choice. While we are not ordinarily privy to
what maximizes others' satisfaction, conceived of as the gratification of an urgent desire, we do have access to what is morally
good for them, as do they. We can thus both be certain in
judgments of a certain sort and hold others to the consequences of these judgments. Whatever the preferences of
others and whatever the causes of those preferences, when it
comes to the moral goodness or evil of their choices, we can
often speak definitively. We can, that is, say of murder, rape,
and arson that they are wrong. We can, further, say something
morally important about the process by which those kinds of
choices are made. That last point will provide the linkage
between choice and punishment.
Everything rides here on the relationship between happiness and goodness. From the Psalmist to Kant, at least, the
structure of this relationship has proved to be immensely puzzling, even mysterious, and my few observations here will
scarcely be exhaustive of what can be said, but let me venture
the following. I tell my children that I want them to be happy
and that I want them to be good. I can assure them that most
of the time goodness will lead to happiness, but I must
acknowledge that there may be occasions when morally good
choices result in intense personal unhappiness. I can finesse
this last point by distinguishing between superficial and
profound happiness and by arguing that righteous persons who
suffer from the ostracism that their unpopular conduct elicits
can rejoice in the sense of integrity that they have retained, and
I can extend this same claim to situations where wealth or status or even life is taken from the just who do right in the face of
a social consensus to the contrary. Alternatively, of course, one
can always assert that the coincidence of goodness and happiness will be achieved in the afterlife, where eternal happiness
will be bestowed on those who sacrificed terrestrial happiness
in order to do good in circumstances in which it went unacknowledged or rejected. As nothing forces us to choose
between these two strategies, we are free to accept both of
them either independently or, as I prefer, as mutually
supportive.
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One could, of course, reject both of these strategies and
argue that the possibility that goodness will not produce happiness renders our entire condition absurd. One could, on the
other hand, devise a more sophisticated strategy of reconciliation than either of those that I have suggested here. None of
this, however, should distract us from two things: first, that
happiness, like moral goodness, is intelligible-it is not hopelessly inaccessible and utterly privatized such that only I am
expert on my happiness and only you on yours; and second that
there is standardly a convergence between happiness and
goodness, one that actually illuminates both of them.
If what I have just said is true, it follows that choice itself
has an intelligibility that at first blush we are inclined to deny to
it. When we choose, we choose what for the moment, at least,
we have convinced ourselves is good and conducive to our happiness. When in fact that choice is of something evil, we have
perforce rationalized our choosing, presenting the evil to ourselves as good. The modes of rationalization are as varied as is
the human capacity for evil. A complete account of them would
cover the rationalization of self-regarding evils, like gluttony
and sloth, as well as the rationalization of the other-regarding
evils that are the standard occasions for legal punishment. For
our purposes here, however, we can act as if those rationalizations could be reduced to the unwarranted privileging of our
own agenda and to the equally unwarranted marginalizing of
the legitimate demands of others. The abstractions that I have
just used mask monumental difficulties relating to how we
determine when self-preference is justified and when not and
as to how we determine when the marginalization of others'
demands is tolerable and when not, but that is as it should be
as the resolution of those difficulties is not my objective here.
My objective is the more modest one of linking up the rationalization essential to wrong-doing with the phenomenon of
punishment.
At this juncture it might be helpful to correct an error
often attributed to Plato's thinking about choice. Plato is said
to have reasoned from the fact that what we choose we choose
as good to the conclusion that wrong-doing is a species of ignorance. That, however, is a mistake. Ignorance and rationalization differ in at least one crucial respect: the former often
exculpates morally; the latter regularly inculpates morally. Not
to know facts relevant to the wrongness of a course of conduct
absolves one of blame where the ignorance is not itself culpable, but rationalization is a wholly different matter. When we
rationalize, we momentarily and more or less consciously take
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leave of the relations that constitute the moral community that
subsists between us and our fellows. We act as if those relations did not obtain, and we pretend for a moment to an
exemption from them to which we have no right. We do this by
way of a more or less skillful bit of self-deception, and the selfdeception is, unlike genuine ignorance, itself evidence of our
guilt.
When we engage in wrongdoing, it is as if we were asserting a falsehood that is so palpably false and so utterly destructive that not even we, the wrongdoers, can acknowledge it;
hence, the evasion, the self-deception, the rationalization.
What it is that we assert in our wrongdoing is either that we
enjoy an exemption from the constraints of morality that we,
quite properly, deny to others, or that there are at least some
others whose equally proper demand for morally defensible
treatment at our hands has no hold on us. Punishment is, I
believe, ordinarily best understood as a response to that assertion. When we punish, we say to those who have, by their conduct, asserted their exemption from the constraints of morality
that they are not in fact exempt, that they, like we, are bound to
honor the legitimate moral demands of others. Just as wrongdoing is not mere assertion, so punishment must be more than
a counter-assertion. It too must take the form of conduct, and
that conduct must be intended to burden the one receiving it.
Unlike the burdening incident to wrongdoing, the burdening
incident to punishment is moralized; i.e. it is presented to the
world as either permitted or required morally-as if the failure
to punish would itself be a wrong. The burdening is meant not
so much to right a past wrong or even to square accounts with
the wrongdoer, as to reassert the fundamental terms of life in a
moral community in the face of the wrongdoer's assertion of
his or her exemption from them. Punishment is, therefore, a
necessary part of any moral community's means of providing
for its own vindication and self-preservation.
Punishment, understood as conduct intended to burden
one believed to be a wrongdoer and intended as response to
the morally intolerable assertion that was implicit in the wrongdoer's act, is wholly consistent with-although it does not
require-love for the one being punished. Insofar as we hope
by punishment to disabuse those being punished of the self-

deception effected by their rationalizations of their choices, we
are intending their good in ways wholly consistent with love
form them. Insofar as we despair of bringing wrongdoers back
into moral community with the rest of us-as in capital punishment-then the responsive component of that punishment is
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addressed to the community, the moral ties to which the malefactor has allegedly broken by his or her wrongdoing.- In either
case, the extent to which punishment communicates is determined by factors external to punishment itself-by, for exampie, the mode of the punishment, the credibility of the
punisher, the docility of the one being punished, and the attitudes of others in the community. The key point here is that
punishment need not--although it may be-intended "to
crush" the one being punished and it need not-although it
may be-an expression of hatred for him or her, as any parent
who has ever punished a child knows.
To punish is to acknowledge membership in the moral
community and to respond to one form or another of
attempted defection from that community. This is why it is correct, if apparently perverse, to say that in punishing others we
honor them-in punishing we take others seriously; we treat
them as moral agents, we impute to them an awareness of the
norms the observance of which makes moral community possible, we assume, as we are entitled to, their endorsement of
those norms at least notionally and inchoately, and we predicate of them the capacity to conform their conduct to the
requirements of those norms. In punishing we distinguish
between agents and their acts, saying of some of their acts that
they are expressive of the agents in their best self-understanding and of other of their acts that they are expressive of the
agents only in self-understanding that it is neither possible nor
tolerable for them to maintain. In this sense too, punishment is
consistent with love inasmuch as it attempts to bring the one
being punished around to a self-understanding that both
accords with reality and makes community with him or her
desirable.
If we understand adolescence as the socially constructed
set of processes whereby the young of a society are gradually
integrated into the ranks of its mature members, and if we
understand punishment as conduct responsive to attempted
defection from moral community with one's fellows, we are in a
position to see the relationship between adolescence and punishment. On a social level, adolescents are shedding the derivative identity they once had as children of their parents and
acquiring an identity more or less their own, one to which the
identity of their parents is not crucial. On a moral level, they
ought to be achieving a different and better purchase on moral
agency than the one that characterized their childhood. Their
awareness of the obligatory character of moral norms ought to
be sharper. Their ability to ground those norms in some
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account of reciprocal respect among persons of equal moral
worth ought to be greater. Their endorsement of those norms
ought to be more whole-hearted. Their willingness to conform
their conduct to them ought to be more complete, even when
that conformity costs them something very desirable. All of
this, however, is commonly very inchoate, very rudimentary.
The adolescent's grasp on the intrinsic attractiveness of the
good is still very weak, and adolescence as we have structured it
in twentieth century America, deprives the struggling man- or
woman-child of many of the supports that should help him or
her to strengthen that grasp. We, therefore, rightly regard
adolescents as less responsible for wrongdoing than adults are,
and we correctly attempt to devise modes of punishment that
are both less harsh and more reintegrative than are those that
we impose upon adult wrongdoers.
This issue of our Journal explores the most troublesome
problems that can confront one who tries to relate punishment
to adolescents. Those are problems stemming from the phenomenon of serious and persistent juvenile criminality. The
issue is divided into four sections. In the first article in the first
section, Franklin Zimring focuses on the process by which
some serious juvenile offenders are tried and, if convicted, punished as if they were adults. This process is known as waiver.
Zimring argues that for all of its faults, a system of discretionary waiver is superior to other ways of addressing the problem
of serious juvenile criminality. He also offers a basic waiver criterion, some guidance to the appellate courts that will inevitably review waiver decisions, and some suggestions as to how
the sentencing of those juveniles who are convicted in criminal
court should be governed. In their article, Donna Bishop and
Charles Frazier focus on the phenomenon of prosecutorial
waiver. Basing their conclusions upon a study of prosecutorial
practice in Florida, Bishop and Frazier argue for the abolition
of prosecutorial waiver, and in favor of reliance upon the legislature and the judiciary to effect the transfer of juveniles to
criminal court in appropriate cases. Where prosecutorial
waiver is allowed, they argue that the discretion that prosecutors enjoy relative to it should be severely constrained by the
legislative articulation of standards and guidelines. This, they
believe, will promote the even-handed treatment of juveniles
caught up in the toils of such a system.
In the third article of the first section, Gilbert Geis and
Arnold Binder offer a critique of legislation that would make
parents civilly or criminally liable for the crimes of their children. Then Martin Forst and Martha-Elin Blomquist review
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the history, ancient (1890-1920) and modem (1960-1990), of
the American juvenile law with a view towards assessing the
value of the reforms introduced in the modem era. They conclude their article by making the case for the "graduated
responsibility" of the juvenile offender, requiring sentencing to
be moderated to take account of the offender's diminished culpability. Ira Schwartz, Martha Wade Steketee, and Jeffrey Butts
next argue that the reform movement of the 1970s had little
impact on the practices ofjuvenile justice systems in the 1980s.
Over the past decade, they contend, those systems have
become more punitive and more incarceration-oriented than
they were in the '70s, despite the pressure from federal law and
other sources to move in a contrary direction. They advocate
efforts to reduce race- and gender-based disparities in juvenile
incarceration, and to educate the public as to the "true facts"
regarding juvenile crime. They also advocate a federal leadership role in juvenile justice policy-formation.
In the final article in the first section of this issue Charles
Springer, a Justice on the Nevada Supreme Court, argues
against the rehabilitative orientation of juvenile courts. He
offers instead a justice-modeled juvenile court. Justice
Springer believes that the juvenile justice system, however we
structure it, is unlikely to have much of an impact on the juvenile crime rate. He believes, however, that we as a society have
a moral obligation to acknowledge the moral agency, albeit
diminished in most cases, of those juveniles who are brought
into juvenile court and to treat them as they deserve to be
treated. He then sketches some of the components of a juve-.
nile justice system predicated upon his justice model.
The "Essays" section of this issue begin with a highly technical meta-analysis of research literature on the effect of juvenile offender treatment programs on recidivism rates. The
authors of that essay, Albert Roberts and Michael Camasso,
conclude that those programs that include family counseling
probably are more effective at reducing recidivism than are
those that do not. As to other strategies, Roberts and Camasso
argue that there does not now exist reliable evidence in support of their effectiveness. In her essay, Anne Rankin Mahoney
argues that American society will not begin to solve the multiple problems posed by serious juvenile offenders until it develops a comprehensive network of services for children that
complements the set of sanctions that we apply to juvenile
offenders. In his student article, Gregory Bassham analyses
Justice Antonin Scalia's approach to constitutional challenges
to the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders.
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Bassham finds Scalia's approach to be seriously defective. He,
like Zimring in his article and Forst and Blomquist in theirs,
argues that even those juvenile offenders who commit homicide ought to be spared the death penalty because their youth
denies them the capacity for full moral culpability.
The final section of this issue consists of a Report by the
Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation that focuses on those programs that seem to succeed at reducing crime rates and drug
use among urban youth. It is included in this issue in part to
balance the highly theoretical tone of most of the other contributions to it and in part to suggest that, as redoubtable as the
serious juvenile crime problem is, there are steps that states
and municipalities can take to reduce the incidence of youth
crime in their jurisdictions. Despair in the face of monumental
difficulties and of the failure of past efforts to overcome them is
so attractive and so destructive that grounds for hope need to
be revealed wherever they exist. The Eisenhower Foundation
Report argues that those grounds are abundant.
Do we have the energy, the imagination, and the self-confidence to refashion the social construct that we know as adolescence so that the passage from childhood to maturity is less
prey to disaster? Can and should we come to see serious juvenile crime as, in large part, a by-product of that. construct?
Should we understand serious juvenile crime against the background of an adolescence that needs restructuring or should
we understand it primarily as the moral fault of the youths who
perpetrate it-or can we strive to understand it both as a
socially conditioned phenomenon and as culpable conduct?
These are hard questions, for which I, at least, have no determinate answers. My hope, however, is that the few thoughts
advanced in this Foreword and the many advanced in the contributions that make up this issue will make it easier for all of us
to ask and to answer those, and other, related, questions more
intelligently than we otherwise might.

